



COLD WAR CHINA

NYUMUNC XV

Joint Crisis Committee

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NSC Cold War: China

Committee Background Guide



Joint Crisis Committee

New York Model United Nations Conference

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Welcome Letters

Meet Your Joint Crisis Director

Greetings Delegates!

My name is Sophie Chaves, and I am thrilled to be your joint crisis director for NYUMUNC's Cold War JCC! I grew up in Greenwich, Connecticut and am a third-year student at NYU majoring in Global Public Health and Biology and minoring in French.

I was briefly involved in MUN in high school and am now a current member of NYU's travel Team. I have staffed two of NYU's conferences and this is my first conference as joint crisis director! Outside of MUN, I research Public Health with NYU's Grossman School of Medicine and love to paint and read in my free time.

I'm very excited to staff this JCC and will work to ensure that this committee stays consistent and flows smoothly!

Good luck,

Sophie Chaves, Joint Crisis Director

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Meet Your Crisis Director

Hi everyone!

My name is Alia Arafeh and I am a sophomore from Los Gatos, California. I am excited to serve as your Crisis Director for the China side of the Cold War JCC. This is my first time as a Crisis Director and first year ever participating in Model UN. I was a crisis analyst for EmpireMUNC in November, and I am looking forward to taking on a bigger role this spring. I've learned a lot in the past several months since joining the club and I'm sure there is much more to learn from all of you in our upcoming conference.

Outside of Model UN, I am studying International Relations with a minor in Economics and a specialization in the Middle East and French. I am also fluent in Arabic and have family all over the Middle East. If I'm not studying, you might find me in the Lower East Side, where I work as an Americorps member teaching at a preschool, or cooking in my tiny dorm kitchen. I also love to watch movies and am (semi) active on Letterboxd - my top movie is Grave of the Fireflies - and I've recently taken up knitting and crocheting.

If I've learned anything from my studies of International Relations it's that, despite what some theorists think, domestic politics absolutely affect international affairs. The Cold War is proof of that, as changing cultures and core virtues largely affected how the three superpowers interacted with each other. I hope you keep that in mind during the conference and I hope that you enjoy debating the Cold War as much as I will enjoy working behind the scenes. Good luck everyone!

Your Crisis Director,

Alia Arafeh, Crisis Director of Cold War China



Meet Your Chair

Hello everyone!

My name is Laila Rehman and I am thrilled to chair the China side of the NYUMUNC Cold War JCC! I am currently a sophomore in the Liberal Studies program at NYU majoring in Politics and Environmental Studies.



I'm a New Jersey native and grew up near Philadelphia- but I have always loved New York City. I spend my free time watching movies and (like your crisis director) staying active on Letterboxd- my favorite film is La La Land. I also enjoy listening to music and am a huge fan of Lana del Rey. Outside of MUN, I am a member of the NYU Mock Trial team.

I have been involved with MUN throughout high school and chairing debate has always been one of my favorite parts of MUN. I'm now a member of NYU's Travel Team and this is my second time staffing a collegiate conference! I am so excited to see how this committee moves about critical issues of one of the most defining moments in history. China emerging in the bipolar world of the late 1960s as a third actor of the Cold War has set off many of the political, economic, and social structures and norms we live with today. This Cold War Joint Crisis Committee between China, the US, and the USSR deals with issues of trade, nuclear arms, ideological differences, and many more relevant topics of foreign relations. I am so excited to see what you all come up with!

Your chair,

Laila Rehman, Chair of Cold War China

Statement of Diversity and Inclusion

At NYUMUNC, we are dedicated to maintaining an educational and historically accurate experience for all participants. We acknowledge that discussions surrounding historical events, particularly in the context of the Cold War, involve many sensitive issues. Delegates are expected to approach these topics with a high level of maturity and respect. NYUMUNC is committed to promoting a culture of diversity and inclusion, aligning with NYU's values. We firmly reject the use of any bigoted symbols, statements, or attitudes during the entirety of our conference.

Recognizing the inherently sensitive nature of this committee's topic, NYUMUNC finds it imperative to establish explicit guidelines. Delegates are strictly prohibited from engaging in any actions involving crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression; this includes genocides, chemical warfare, war crimes, or any serious offenses. Delegates found in violation of these guidelines will face appropriate repercussions.

Should you have specific concerns or questions regarding the appropriateness of certain topics, we encourage you to reach out to us via email or during the conference. Thank you, and we look forward to a conference with a respectful, inclusive, and educational environment!

Introduction

Strap on your helmet and cue Bert the Turtle, because in the wake of the Second World War, we find ourselves in a relentless pursuit of creating advanced weaponry. The aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki displayed the devastating power of the atomic bomb, propelling major powers, such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China, into a feverish race to develop hundreds to thousands of these weapons, all striving for technological advancement and superiority. On every front, these nations fervently competed to engineer explosives with increasing yield and even greater destructive abilities.

Enter the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT, 1969), a conference hosted by the United States with 27,552 warheads and the Soviet Union with 10,671 warheads. The purpose of these bilateral talks was to restrict the ever-growing stockpile of nuclear warheads amid escalating uncertainties during the Cold War. The treaty established several limitations on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, its failure stemmed from a lack of verification and the emergence of new technologies that allowed the development of more advanced weapons outside the treaty's scope.

This committee starts with political turmoil: August 9th, 1974, with Nixon's resignation. As a delegate embodying the spirit of your character, you are tasked with navigating this tumultuous political and growing technological landscape. The echoes of failed treaties and the looming threat of unrestrained nuclear proliferation set the stage for a committee where every decision matters. As we step into the shoes of the National Security Council for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China respectively, it is your duty to ensure that despite this race for nuclear proliferation and personal technological advancement, we must come to an agreement to save the unpredictable future at hand from nuclear threat. The

doomsday clock is approaching midnight so the stakes have never been higher. Welcome to the Cold War Joint Crisis Committee!

Committee Mechanics

The Cold War was a multifaceted period in which various positions, opinions, and events were held and occurred. Consequently, this branch will be part of a three-way Cold War Joint Crisis Committee (JCC), with the other two committees being the USSR and the US. Each of the three committees will run as a typical crisis committee where the frontroom (caucuses and directives) and backroom (crisis notes and JPDs) will impact each committee's course of action. However, as this is a JCC, decisions, policies, and efforts within each committee will additionally impact the other two. These impacts can range from simple trade deals and policies to full-blown combat. You can also (and encouraged to) contact those on the other sides of the JCC through your back room by addressing the position you want to contact.

Each day will have new and exciting topics to discuss and crises to solve, some predetermined and some determined by your participation. To maximize your impact on the committee (and the NSC as a whole), try to respond to these topics with a combination of effectiveness and efficiency WHILE following the Statement of Diversity and Inclusion. We all want to have fun, but not at the expense of respect.

With regard to crisis notes, we will be utilizing a fast-paced, online two-pad system. You will be given two digital notepads (as well as physical one's for delegate usage), each corresponding to a different branch of your overall crisis arc. While you write on one digital notepad, the backroom will respond to the other. When the notes of all delegates have been responded to, the backroom will come in, deliver a crisis update, and announce a timeline for the

next note response cycle. This cycle will repeat up until the end of the committee on Saturday. Your JCD and CD would look favorably upon backroom requests that are realistic. Given that this is a historical committee and the seriousness of the topic, it should be approached with a commitment to realism and authenticity to the time period. Those who cleverly demonstrate this commitment will be recognized.

Ultimately, this committee will be incredibly complicated, but in a positive way. Because of this, we thank you for your patience, understanding, and best efforts for the weekend. If you have any further questions about committee logistics, please feel free to contact the JCD, CD, or Chair.

Background

At 2:45 AM local time on the morning of August 6, 1945, the Enola Gay, a B-29 Superfortress, and an observation plane called the “Necessary Evil” took off from the small island of Tinian. They were embarking on the first mission of the Cold War. At 7:09 AM, air raid sirens blared. At 8:14 Aioi Bridge is spotted by the Enola Gay, and the countdown begins. Exactly a minute later, bombardier Thomas Ferebe announces “bombs away.” The bomb falls for 43 seconds, then detonates. “Buildings melt and fuse together, human and animal tissue is vaporized. The blast wave travels at 984 miles per hour in all directions, demolishing over two-thirds of Hiroshima’s buildings in a massive, expanding firestorm. Eighty thousand people are instantly killed or grievously wounded. Over 100,000 more will die from the bomb’s effects in the coming months.”¹

¹National Park Service. “The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (U.S. National Park Service).” *Www.nps.gov*, 4 Apr. 2023, www.nps.gov/articles/000/the-atomic-bombings-of-hiroshima-and-nagasaki.htm.

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin accelerated his search for the bomb. “If a child doesn't cry,” Stalin told Igor Kurchatov, the scientific director of the Soviet project, “the mother doesn't know what he needs. Ask for whatever you like. You won't be refused.”² By 1949, Stalin had his bomb. This did not end the arms race, it accelerated it. In 1948 the United States had 55 nuclear weapons. By 1950 they had almost 700.³ The Soviets and the Americans raced to produce more weapons, with larger yields, longer ranges, that could be deployed more rapidly. Soon, the two great powers could destroy not only each other, but the world, many times over. Soviet domination of eastern Europe, in stark contrast to western Europe's closeness with America, had already created a bipolar world. With the 1949 test, that bipolarity became unchallengeable, and one of the great battles at the time was which side China would end up on.

The Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, and the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, had been at war since 1927,⁴ although they had agreed to a cessation of combat to defeat the Japanese in 1937. When WWII ended in 1945, both the US and the USSR hoped that the Civil War would not be rekindled. The United States even sent George Marshall to negotiate peace talks, and the Soviets officially recognized the KMT well into the conflict. Despite entreaties by both the United States and the USSR, by 1947 the fighting had resumed in earnest. While the United States armed and aided the KMT, the Soviets provided little assistance to the CCP. In 1948, the Soviets made a peace proposal: “the KMT ruled the southern part of the Yangtze River while the Chinese Communists controlled the northern part, and that the United States should recognise the Soviet Union's special privileges in Manchuria.”⁵ The Soviets were

²McMillan, Priscilla Johnson. “NYTimes.” *Archive.nytimes.com*, 2 Oct. 1994, archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/06/specials/holloway-stalin.html.

³Rosenberg, David R. *U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950*. no. 5, May 1982, pp. 25–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1982.11455736>.

⁴Cucchisi, Jennifer. *The Causes and Effects of the Chinese Civil War, 1927-1949*. 2002, scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3416&context=dissertations.

⁵Kim, Donggil. “Stalin and the Chinese Civil War.” *Cold War History*, vol. 10, no. 2, May 2010, pp. 185–202, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682741003619447>.

far more concerned with the balance of power than they were with the global revolution. Despite Soviet pressure to end the war, Mao and the CCP pressed on, defeating the KMT in October 1949, forcing Chiang Kai-shek and his men to flee to Taiwan. The United States refused to officially recognize Mao's China, the People's Republic of China, and instead chose to recognize the Republic of China Chiang Kai-shek's government in exile on Taiwan. Mao's victory, while not a setback for the USSR, was not as beneficial as it could have been. Stalin's refusal to back Mao is a wound that would continue to fester for years.

Meanwhile, Kim Il-Sung, the leader of North Korea, had been pressing Stalin for permission to invade the South. Stalin had been refusing, fearing the United States would become involved, but his calculus had changed. Stalin now had a bomb of his own. Additionally, American non-intervention in China gave him confidence they would refrain from intervening in Korea as well. Additionally, Mao's government had signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance earlier in 1950. When Kim asked again in April of 1950, Stalin acquiesced, but made it clear that Soviet forces would not become directly involved. Mao made no such equivocations. On June 25, the North invaded. The UN Security Council met to decide on a course of action, and unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of South Korea that very day with Resolution 82. They then met again on the 27th, passing Resolution 83, which recommended military action against the North. The Soviet Union could have vetoed both of these, but they had been boycotting the Security Council since January due to the ROC's continued holding of China's permanent seat at the Security Council. In conjunction with this, President Harry Truman "ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa,"⁶ which

⁶ "Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea | Harry S. Truman." *W*www.trumanlibrary.gov, www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/173/statement-president-situation-korea.

effectively put Taiwan, and by extension the ROC, under US protection. This “neutralization” of the Taiwan issue effectively ensured the existence of the “two Chinas.”⁷

Another key question raised by the Korean war was the efficacy of battlefield use for nuclear weapons. After all, the United States had a clearly superior stockpile, so what stopped them from using nuclear weapons? “Ultimately, it was not even clear that atomic bombing in a war against peasant armies would produce decisive results. If the Americans used the bomb and the Chinese forces kept on coming, it would demonstrate the bomb's ineffectiveness and reduce its deterrent effect in other arenas.”⁸ Nuclear weapons, even this early in the cold war, were proving themselves to be more effective as a political tool than as a battlefield weapon. (perhaps elaborate) Korean War ends in 1953.

The events of 1953 and 1954 marked a dramatic shift in the tenor of the Cold War. The death of Joseph Stalin provided an opportunity for a change in relations with the Soviet Union, as would the end of the Korean war. The United States also deployed a new tactic in these years, successfully overthrowing the democratically elected leaders of Iran and Guatemala, replacing them with more pliant clients.⁹ The Soviet Union’s leadership crisis after the death of Stalin is also resolved at this time, with Nikita Khrushchev becoming the new leader of the USSR. One of his first moves is to establish the Warsaw Pact, a defensive alliance against the West, essentially an answer to NATO. The People's Republic of China is invited, but they declined, instead attending the Bandung Conference (which was the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement) that same year. “Mao had sought Soviet support as a counterweight to potential American pressure on China in pursuit of American hegemony in Asia. But concurrently he tried to

⁷Matray, James. “Beijing and the Paper Tiger: The Impact of the Korean War on Sino-American Relations.” *International Journal of Korean Studies* , vol. XV, no. 1, p. 157, [icks.org/n/data/ijks/1483321954_add_file_8.pdf](https://www.icks.org/n/data/ijks/1483321954_add_file_8.pdf).

⁸ “The Korean War | American Experience | PBS.” *www.pbs.org*
www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/bomb-korean-war/#:~:text=Ultimately%2C%20it%20was%20not%20even.

⁹ “Cold War Timeline (Text Only)- History of War in the 20th Century.” *Publish.uwo.ca*,
publish.uwo.ca/~acopp2/historyofwar/coldwar/timeline-text.html.

organize the Non-Aligned into a safety net against Soviet hegemony.”¹⁰ The next year, Khrushchev would push Mao even further away.

At the 1956 party conference, Khrushchev delivered what came to be known as “the Secret Speech.” It was called this, in part, because the speech was closed to outsiders, including the Chinese delegation. The insult of not being allowed to witness the speech was little compared to the content. In the speech, officially called “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” Khrushchev sharply denounced the brutality of Stalin’s regime, describing many of its abuses in detail. Additionally, Khrushchev repudiated the very idea of “personality cults,” saying that the “classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual.”¹¹ The Chinese delegation worked to piece together what was said in conversation with those who were in the room, but they did not find out the full content of the speech, delivered on February 25th, until June 5th. And they had to find out from the New York Times, who had been leaked a copy by the CIA.¹² The headline that day blared “KHRUSHCHEV TALK ON STALIN BARES DETAILS OF RULE BASED ON TERROR.”¹³ This was not merely insulting to the Chinese leadership, it was potentially destabilizing. Whatever ideological and geopolitical differences Mao had with Stalin, his grip on power rested on a similar personality cult. In addition to denouncing Stalin, Khrushchev also announced a major reversal in Soviet relations with the West.

¹⁰Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. Penguin, 2011. pp.152

¹¹Khrushchev, Nikita. “Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, ‘on the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,’ Delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union | Wilson Center Digital Archive.” *Digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org*, 25 Feb. 1956.

digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/khrushchevs-secret-speech-cult-personality-and-its-consequences-delivered-twentieth-party.

¹²“Trade Secrets - Haaretz - Israel News.” *Web.archive.org*, 17 Feb. 2008, web.archive.org/web/20080217092411/www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=69298.

¹³“KHRUSHCHEV TALK on STALIN BARES DETAILS of RULE BASED on TERROR; CHARGES PLOT for KREMLIN PURGES; U.S. ISSUES a TEXT Dead Dictator Painted as Savage, Half-Mad and Power-Crazed Khrushchev Discusses Delay Speech Adds Much Detail STALIN DEPICTED as SAVAGE DESPOT Korean War Data Awaited Many Officers Liquidated Revelations by Khrushchev ‘Leningrad Affair’ Recalled ‘Doctors’ Plot Laid to Stalin.” *The New York Times*, timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1956/06/05/86605470.html?pageNumber=1.

Instead of assuming the inevitability of war with the west, as there had been under Stalin, the USSR would now pursue “peaceful coexistence.”¹⁴

Despite this push for “peaceful coexistence,” Khrushchev boasted frequently about the USSR’s large stockpile of ICBMs, in hopes that the West’s fear of nuclear annihilation would allow for him to extract political concessions. Khrushchev, however, was bluffing. The Soviet stockpile was relatively small, and, unbeknownst to Khrushchev, high level American officials knew this. In 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik, the first spacecraft, which dramatically heightened fears of Soviet capabilities, even among high level officials who knew the stockpile was small. Just a month later, Khrushchev hosted a conference of socialist countries, the primary aim of which was to repair relations following the 1956 speech. Mao chose to attend, the second and last time he would leave China. While he paid lip service to Khrushchev’s “peaceful coexistence,” the speech Mao delivered offered a stunning, and terrifying, alternate approach. “We shouldn’t be afraid of atomic missiles,” Mao declared, “no matter what kind of war breaks out, conventional or nuclear, we will win... If the imperialists unleash war on us, we may lose more than 300 million people. So what? War is war. The years will pass and we will get to work making more babies than ever before.”¹⁵ It is in this context that Mao sparked another conflict with the United States.

On August 23, 1958, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) began shelling the Taiwanese islands of Quemoy and Matsu in what is known as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The shelling was, according to Mao, a response to the US and British occupations of Lebanon and Jordan that began that July.¹⁶ This operation was an implicit rebuke of Soviet inaction in response to

¹⁴“Milestones: 1953–1960 - Office of the Historian.” *State.gov*, 2019. history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/khrushchev-20th-congress.

¹⁵ Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. Penguin, 2011. pp. 154

¹⁶“Memoir by Wu Lengxi, ‘inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen’ | Wilson Center Digital Archive.” *Digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org*, digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/memoir-wu-lengxi-inside-story-decision-making-during-shelling-jinm.

American action in the Middle East. However, America did not know this, and assumed that the Chinese actions were done at the behest of Moscow. Thus, China strained Khrushchev's relationship with the West and enlisted him as a nuclear ally in a conflict over which he had no control. Mao's bid to undermine "peaceful coexistence" was largely unsuccessful. In fact, these actions did more to damage Sin-Soviet relations than Soviet-American. Moscow suspended nuclear cooperation, withdrew all technicians, and suspended all aid projects. The consequences of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, alongside the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, would leave China largely absent from the world stage in the decade to come.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev continued to pursue better relations with the United States. In 1959 then Vice-President Richard Nixon visited Khrushchev in Moscow, where they had their famous "kitchen table debate." The debate was seen by some as part of Nixon's campaign to win the presidency in 1960.¹⁷ His opponent in that race was the young Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy. Kennedy, as a part of his campaign, ran against the "missile gap," exasperating fears that the United States was weak, and the Eisenhower-Nixon administration was to blame. "The nation was losing the satellite-missile race with the Soviet Union because of" Kennedy claimed, "complacent miscalculations, penny-pinching, budget cutbacks, incredibly confused mismanagement, and wasteful rivalries and jealousies."¹⁸ Due in part to his stoking of these nuclear fears, Kennedy beat Nixon in 1960.

The Kennedy Administration, more than any other in American history, was defined by its relationship with nuclear armageddon. "On the one hand he created the Arms Control and

¹⁷ "News of the Week in Review", *The New York Times*, July 26, 1959

¹⁸ Preble, Christopher A. "Who Ever Believed in the "Missile Gap"?": John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 4, 2003, pp. 801-26, www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27552538.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A6ce8a71f886e16ae307ceab4e5b2b165&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1.

Disarmament Agency, and on the other he expanded the number of American intercontinental ballistic missiles from some 60 to more than 420.”¹⁹ And then there was Cuba.

In 1959, Fidel Castro successfully overthrew the US backed Cuban Dictator Fulgencio Batista. The CIA, under orders from President Eisenhower and with the knowledge of Vice President Nixon, began drawing up plans to overthrow Castro. Nixon, to his own surprise, was not the man in the Oval Office once those plans were ready. In 1960, Kennedy ran to the right of Nixon on the issue of Cuba, castigating the administration's inaction. He was eager and ready to overthrow Castro, but when he was presented with the CIA's plan, he had second thoughts. The plan looked implausible, but, in the recollection of National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, “If we didn't do it [i.e., the operation], the Republicans would have said: ‘We were all set to beat Castro, and this chicken, this antsy-pantsy bunch of liberals’ ... there would have been a political risk in not going through with the operation. Saying no would have brought all the hawks out of the woodwork.”²⁰ The mission was launched in April of 1961, and Kennedy was right to be worried about the plan: it was a disaster.

In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro asked Moscow for assistance, and a delegation from the USSR arrived in May 1962 to discuss the requests. In September of 1961 Castro asked for surface to air (SAM) missiles, and as of May, 1962 they still hadn't arrived, and Moscow was indicating they would be sending even less than originally promised. The same was true of the Sopka shore missiles and of Soviet troops, which Castro hoped would serve as a sort of ‘trip wire’ to deter American invasion. So when the Soviet delegation offered Fidel Castro

¹⁹Paterson, Thomas G. *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*. Oxford University Press, 1992. pp 5

²⁰Glejjeses, Piero. “Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs.” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1, Feb. 1995, pp. 1-42.

nuclear weapons, the Cuban leader was surprised, to say the least.²¹ Cuba was the centerpiece of Khrushchev's grand scheme to rebalance the global order.

"I think," Khrushchev exclaimed, "we will win this operation!"

This operation would achieve three Soviet goals: "altering the international balance of power (the Soviets were behind in the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles) by scaring the United States with missiles nearby, protecting Fidel Castro's Cuba, and forcing a new settlement over the control of West Berlin."²² Khrushchev planned to dramatically announce the existence of the missiles at that year's meeting of the United Nations in November of 1962.

Khrushchev's plan began to unravel on October 16th. American U-2 spy planes had taken photos of Soviet medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba, and Kennedy's National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy delivered the news, along with his advice that the sites had to go. Kennedy concurred. What followed were 6 days of near constant deliberation between Kennedy and his top advisors. The initial plan was to bomb the sites. As it became clear this path may not be entirely effective, Kennedy sought other options. Eventually, Kennedy determined that a blockade, proposed by Secretary of Defense McNamara, was the best course of action. Despite all of the activity, the Kremlin remained unaware of the deliberations until the White House announced the President would be making a speech "of national importance."²³ They sensed, although did not know, that the Cuba plan had been discovered.

Khrushchev and his advisors were agitated, "the tragedy is that they can attack, and we shall respond," Khrushchev predicted, "this may end in a big war." Kennedy's speech, to the Kremlin's relief, did not announce an attack on Cuba. At least not yet. In the coming days, Soviet ships

²¹ Fursenko, Aleksander A., and Timothy J. Naftali. *Khrushchev's Cold War : The inside Story of an American Adversary*. W.W. Norton, 2007. Pp. 440

²²"Putin's Fear of Retreat." *Foreign Affairs*, 16 Nov. 2022, www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putin-fear-retreat-cuban-missile-crisis.

²³ Fursenko, Aleksander A., and Timothy J. Naftali. *Khrushchev's Cold War : The inside Story of an American Adversary*. W.W. Norton, 2007. Pp. 467

approached the American blockade and the world crept ever closer to war. And then, it was over. As it was described to the American public, “we went eyeball to eyeball with the Russians—and they blinked.”²⁴ In fact, the Cuban missile crisis ended in an important deal, one which brought Khrushchev and Kennedy closer than any two of their predecessors. Khrushchev had offered to remove the missiles from Cuba, but only if the US removed similar missiles from Turkey. Known only to a few advisors, Kennedy did so, but only 6 months later, and only if the Soviets kept the deal a secret.²⁵ By October 27th, it was over.

In the following months, both Khrushchev and Kennedy attempted to build closer ties to each other, trying to lower the temperature and lessen the odds of global annihilation. By “midsummer 1963, the Soviet Union was on better terms with the United States than it was with the Peoples Republic of China.”²⁶

When Kennedy arrived in office, there was already war in Southeast Asia, although he was more concerned with Laos than Vietnam. Laos provided an early opportunity for Khrushchev and Kennedy to work together, negotiating Laotian neutrality at a Geneva conference in 1962.²⁷ In the meantime, things were escalating rapidly in Vietnam: there were under 1,000 US military advisors in Vietnam when Kennedy took office. By the end of 1962 there were 11,000,²⁸ and disaster was on the horizon.

²⁴ Kaplan, Fred. “What Robert Caro Got Wrong.” *Slate*, 31 May 2012, slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/05/robert-caros-new-history-of-lbj-offers-a-mistaken-account-of-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html.

²⁵ Kaplan, Fred. “What Robert Caro Got Wrong.” *Slate*, 31 May 2012, slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/05/robert-caros-new-history-of-lbj-offers-a-mistaken-account-of-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html.

²⁶ Fursenko, Aleksander A., and Timothy J. Naftali. *Khrushchev's Cold War : The inside Story of an American Adversary*. W.W. Norton, 2007. Pp. 28

²⁷Editors, History.com. “Kennedy and Khrushchev Agree on Neutrality for Laos.” *HISTORY*, www.history.com/this-day-in-history/kennedy-and-khrushchev-agree-on-neutrality-for-laos.

²⁸“JFK and Vietnam: The September 1963 TV Interviews | JFK Library.” *Www.jfklibrary.org*, www.jfklibrary.org/learn/education/teachers/curricular-resources/jfk-and-vietnam-the-september-1963-tv-interviews#:~:text=In%20May%201961%2C%20JFK%20authorized.

Saturday, August 24th, 1963 was the zenith of what would become known as “the Buddhist crisis.” The South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem carried out a series of midnight raids killing hundreds, arresting thousands, and cutting the cables to the American embassy. President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara were all on vacation. To deal with the crisis, several high level deputies took it upon themselves to draft a cable to newly installed Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. These high level National Security Council deputies, either unwilling or unable to reach their direct superiors, called President Kennedy at his home in Hyannis Port directly. They asked the President for approval for what would become known as Cable 234: the cable that instructed Ambassador Lodge to tacitly endorse the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem, saying “we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.”²⁹

The cable was drafted by Michael Forrestal of the National Security Council along with Roger Hillsman and Averell Harriman of the State Department. The three men called Kennedy, who agreed to approve the cable if, and only if, the Secretary of State also approved. Then, the men called Rusk, who reportedly said “well, go ahead. If the President understood the implications, [I] would give a green light.”³⁰ Thus, they had the green light from both the Secretary of State and the president, if tenuously. After reaching out to other deputies, although no other cabinet level officials, they returned to Kennedy and informed him that the Cabinet officials had given him the green light. Having consulted none of his senior advisors, Kennedy greenlit a coup on the most important American ally in South East Asia.

On November 2, President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were executed in a military coup. President Kennedy would follow them a few weeks later. Kruschev would

²⁹ Douglas Martin. “Roger Hilsman, Adviser to Kennedy on Vietnam, Dies at 94.”

³⁰ Howard Jones. *Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War*, 315

meet his own end, albeit less violently, a little over a year later. In 1964, the Soviet Union saw a leadership change with Leonid Brezhnev taking over as the General Secretary. Under Brezhnev, the Soviet Union continued its policy of supporting communist movements worldwide, but also pursued détente with the United States, a policy aimed at easing the hostilities of the Cold War.

The Vietnam War escalated significantly during this period, becoming a central front of the Cold War. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam intensified under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, aiming to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. This conflict became highly controversial within the United States, leading to widespread protests and a deep national divide. Despite the massive U.S. military effort, the war ended with the withdrawal of American forces in 1973, and the subsequent fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese forces in 1975, marking a significant setback for U.S. foreign policy and a victory for the Soviet Union and its allies.

The arms race continued unabated during this period, with both superpowers developing and stockpiling an increasing number of nuclear weapons. The threat of nuclear annihilation remained a constant concern globally. However, recognizing the dire implications of this arms buildup, the U.S. and the Soviet Union began to engage in negotiations to limit the growth of their nuclear arsenals. This led to the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) treaty in 1972, which aimed to restrict the number of ballistic missile launchers both countries could have. This was a significant step towards reducing the risk of nuclear conflict.

In 1968, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring, a series of reforms and liberalizations that threatened to loosen the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe. This intervention demonstrated the limits of Soviet tolerance for reform within its sphere of influence and reaffirmed the rigidity of the Iron Curtain.

The period also saw attempts at improving relations between East and West Germany, culminating in the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972, which normalized the relationship between the two German states. This was part of Ostpolitik, West Germany's policy aimed at improving relations with the East, including the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The U.S.-China relations underwent a significant transformation when President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, leading to the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. This strategic rapprochement aimed at isolating the Soviet Union, leveraging the Sino-Soviet split to the advantage of the United States. The opening to China marked a pivotal shift in the Cold War dynamics, introducing a new geopolitical triangle that complicated the bipolar rivalry that had defined the previous decades.

Throughout this period, the Cold War continued to influence global affairs, from Africa to Latin America, where U.S. and Soviet support for opposing factions fueled conflicts and political upheavals. The Cuban Missile Crisis had left a lasting impression on both superpowers, highlighting the catastrophic potential of their rivalry. Consequently, despite ongoing tensions and conflicts, there was a growing recognition of the need for dialogue and negotiation to prevent a nuclear confrontation.

Side of JCC Breakdown

Increased World Involvement

As the Cold War continued primarily as a feud between the United States and the Soviet Union, domestic changes in China began to set the stage for the nation to become a third actor in the Cold War. Both the Communist Revolution, which formally established the People's

Republic of China, along with the foreign relations of this newly established government solidified the PRC as a third actor in the war.

The Communist Revolution in China arguably began with the success of Mao Zedong leading a civil war in the nation, promising communism in the form of land returns to peasants and overall emancipation from the wealthy, ruling capitalists. He renamed the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China. The government of the then existing Republic of China, led by General Chiang Kai-shek, left the mainland for the island of Taiwan. To this day, both governments claim to be the “real” China, a struggle that can just begin to characterize the tensions between the PRC and Taiwan.

Late Cultural Revolution

The Cultural Revolution of the PRC was a sociopolitical movement from around 1966-1976 that largely defines their influence in the Cold War and their later influence on a global scheme. The movement's goals were to eliminate capitalism and preserve Chinese Communism, an act which somewhat failed ideologically, but remained a political success in keeping Mao Zedong as the nation's leader. It's argued that such failures occurred due to the increased prevalence of political moderates, as opposed to far-left communists, following the Great Leap Forward and Great Chinese Famine.

The theory behind the Cultural Revolution was to destroy capitalism, but evolved to include the destruction of the “four olds” of China: cultures, ideas, customs, and habits. There was a motive to end the humiliation of China by Western powers through the Opium Wars and other forms of injustices.



Mao's Cult of Personality

A driver of the Cultural Revolution was a “cult of personality” surrounding Mao Zedong. The government used propaganda to idolize Mao Zedong, easing the process for him to gain and maintain political power. Mao Zedong, along with objects or ideas associated with him became important symbols towards solidifying public support for his reign. One example of this was the propagandization of mangoes. Mao Zedong received mangoes from a Pakistani foreign minister in 1968 and sent them to his propaganda team. The mangoes reached Tsinghua University, a hotspot during the Cultural Revolution, and “mango fever” soon ensued. People worshiped mangoes, a largely unfamiliar fruit at the time, and associated its greatness with Mao Zedong’s rule. One dentist spoke out against the mango, claiming it “was nothing special” and that it looked like a sweet potato. He was shot in the head.

Chinese Foreign Relations

Through the 1970s, the PRC decreased aid to Northern Vietnam, deescalating the war but worsening relations with the Communist state and the USSR. Supporting Northern Vietnam, though such support eventually decreased, was one thing that unified the USSR and PRC, despite the Sino-Soviet split. Mao’s decision in supporting North Vietnam was largely based around his view of the United States as his largest threat.

However, China would later influence communism in Southeast Asia, accounting for almost 90% of foreign aid received by the Khmer Rouge responsible for the Cambodian genocide. This event may have caused Henry Kissinger and the US to shift their Cold War focus away from Vietnam and onto Cambodia and Laos.

Urban-rural divide

The divide between urban and rural communities in China grew as the government saw industrialization as key to being on par with the rest of the world's superpowers. In order to kickstart this process, the Chinese government began pursuing heavy industry over agriculture, creating incentives for people to move to the cities and leave their rural towns behind.

This process began in 1952, starting with the Unified Procurement and Unified Sale of Agricultural commodities, a process through which the Chinese government monopolized the process and procurement of agriculture, thus controlling the food supply. They also controlled food production through rations in urban areas, while those in agricultural areas received only the surplus amounts grown.

Another key way in which the government pushed industrialization was through the Household Registration System, which required citizens to register as "rural" or "urban." Registering as rural meant that people and their families were forced to live in the countryside, including future generations. This incentivized people to move towards urbanization. While these tactics worked, famine loomed in the distance as more and more people moved to the cities, thus less and less food was produced. The Great Leap Forward is characterized by this urban bias. Grain output decreased by 15 percent, allowing the food supply to only reach about 70 percent of people. This led to a devastating famine, killing tens of millions of people.

China and the UN

When the People's Republic of China first formed, the United Nations only recognized the Republic of China (which had fled to Taiwan) as the government of China. The PRC was unhappy that the government that they saw as "illegitimate" was that which represented them in the global scheme.

The People's Republic of China continued to push for a seat in the UN, until it was finally granted one through Resolution 2758 in 1971. However, the People's Republic of China is a new government with a newly appointed seat in the global arena, so curating their image and making a name for themselves is incredibly important.

Chinese Space Program

China's place in the space race and in missile technology is mostly thanks to the Sino-Soviet alliance. The USSR provided China with vital information on weapons manufacturing, but ended relations and aid in 1953 following the end of the Sino-Soviet split. With little to no information about how to make missiles or rockets, China was left behind in the space race, yet maintained large aspirations including starting a missile program on October 8, 1956 and expressing interest in satellite launching and space travel.

In the next few years, China copied two Soviet missiles as part of the Sino-Soviet alliance - but postponed their launch date due to the split - conducted missile tests in Mongolia, and sent white mice into space. In 1967, Mao officially decided he wanted to join the space race with the United States in Russia. However, the Chinese space program ended shortly after, in 1971, due to political turmoil and lack of resources and knowledge following the Sino-Soviet split, leaving China grounded on Earth for the time being.

US-relations and Nixon's visit

Before President Nixon's visit in February of 1972, tensions were especially heightened, as the United States recognized the Republic of China as the legitimate government for the 30 years after the civil war. This shifted during the Vietnam War, as both parties saw benefits in recreating ties with the other. This was followed by Henry Kissinger's two secret visits in 1971,

and an invitation from the US for the PRC Ping Pong team to play in America, nicknamed “Ping Pong Diplomacy.”

Relations peaked after Nixon visited China, helping issue the Shanghai Communique, which affirmed that Taiwan was a true part of China and opposed attempts for an independent Taiwan. The United States did not challenge this position, but expressed that they would support a peaceful resolution to tensions. Nixon’s visit was a major turning point for improving relations, but progress significantly slowed after the governments came to an agreement. Kissinger’s and Nixon’s visit angered the Soviet Union.

Between 1972-73, the USSR renamed the Chinese names of various regions of the Russian Far East and replaced them with Russian names. The press in the USSR also misrepresented the historical presence of Chinese people and museum exhibits were removed, provoking violence against local Chinese populations in the Russian Far East.

Essential Topics to Understand

Sino-Soviet Split³¹

The relations of the PRC with the Soviet Union were particularly hostile during the first decades of the newly founded communist government. Initially, the two nations saw eye to eye on their hatred for the United States and shared ideals of communism. The alliance came with its perks to the PRC, as the Soviets helped them build atomic bombs, harvest oil, and complete other economic projects. However, the alliance could not remain perfect forever. The Sino-Soviet split was a huge moment in foreign affairs that marked the budding tensions between the two

³¹ “Sino-Soviet Split.” *Wikipedia*, 6 Feb. 2024, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_split#Nuclear_China.

nations. There were several reasons for the severance of this alliance, most of which can be boiled down to a doctrinal and geopolitical split.

In terms of doctrine, Mao Zedong denounced the forms of communism the USSR had begun to uphold following the fall of Joseph Stalin and the rise of Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Zedong believed that the Soviets had adopted *revisionism*, a revised form of Marxism that involves alliances with the bourgeoisie capitalists. To put it shortly, Mao Zedong did not appreciate the Soviets adopting policies of peaceful coexistence with Western Europe, mainly capitalist nations. He preferred the form of communism adopted by Stalin, and believed that the Soviet Union had since diverged from the path of true communism. There was also a struggle amongst communists over which nation would lead the anticipated global communist revolution.

The Space Race

At this point in the Cold War, things are looking up, as world leaders crane their necks towards the sky in pursuit of space travel. Each country wants to be the first to break ground, whether that means creating satellites that can functionally orbit, sending living creatures past the breathable atmosphere, or even landing on the moon. As for China, they are severely behind at this point. After losing important intel and technology following the Sino-Soviet split, they are racing just to catch up with their western counterparts, let alone reach the top.

Nuclear Weapon Development

After Oppenheimer's atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima, questions of who is manufacturing advanced and deadly weaponry and how they might use it create tension on all sides. Growing fear of nuclear weapon development and uranium processing on different parts of the globe increase tensions, but also create reasons for compromise. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have already happened in Helsinki in 1969, but there remains

unregulated weapons and unresolved conflicts between the three superpowers. As with the space race, China has been left largely uninformed about modern technological developments, thus they have to make large strides in their nuclear weapon development, and quickly, to be taken seriously as a nuclear superpower.

Leadership and Power (Im)balances

Holding onto power is difficult, especially in the changing post-World War II world. The abrupt end to Nixon's presidency served as a stark reminder that leadership positions are not always as solid as they seem. Power dynamics are growing and changing in each of these countries as old age, changing ideologies, and scandals threaten each leader's grasp on their position. Mao Zedong's old age is a key factor in China's leadership decisions, as many successors fight for their chance to eventually lead. However, Mao has no intention of ceding his position anytime soon.

Current Economic and Political Ideologies

The influence of communism has grown drastically on the global scale, as major powers experience large-scale ideological revolutions. The more that communism spreads, the more the United States attempts to suppress its influence and make silent enemies of countries that embrace it. At the same time, previously non-industrialized countries including India and China are seeking to benefit economically from rapid industrialization. This is causing drastic changes domestically and internationally, as the global economic market grows and begins to include new actors. China's cultural revolution is still new, and they hope to spread their influence to anywhere they can, yet also face global pressure to remain isolated.

Current Issues

Continuation of the Cultural Revolution

As of the early 1970s, Mao Zedong had launched campaigns against ulterior forms of governmental and economic development, including a strong anti-Lin Bao, anti-Confucian campaign to prevent dissent and solidify the hold he has on power. However, his chronic illness prevents him from governing effectively, and in 1974, it is clear that he is soon to be replaced. This creates the beginning of a power struggle between the infamous Gang of Four where each pines for the highest position in Chinese government and general influence culturally and politically in China, but it is yet to be decided who will come out on top.

Economic Development

Because of Mao's inability to govern effectively (due to his illness), China's economy has taken a fall. All across the country, workers have begun to strike, causing factory shutdowns and stunting economic growth. As the basic cause and effect formula goes, economic strife among workers is leading to increased crime and unhappiness with the performance of the government. Whether or not the economy turns back around is up to this committee.

Agricultural Development

Good news! Agriculture is thriving, even amidst political and economic issues. While this may be good for the government, farmers themselves aren't ecstatic. After all, their farms were taken from them after the Communist Revolution and over 16 million urban youth were taken out of school and forced to engage in manual labor in the countryside as a way of promoting unity among social classes and of reconciling the divide between urban and rural populations following the Great Chinese Famine. At this point, farming is done in communes and individually owned farms are not allowed, and farmers are required to eat as communes.

Agricultural production is up, but at the cost of farmers' autonomy; the communes are not a lasting solution nor one that has increased China's crop outputs enough to put it on the map.

Taiwan

2 years ago, Nixon ordered nuclear weapons to be removed from Taiwan, and just like he was removed from office, his order was implemented in 1974 and the nuclear weapons were removed. Still, the People's Republic of China believes that Taiwan is a rightful part of the mainland and will stop at no end to either reunify peacefully or take over. It doesn't help relations that, at this point, many world governments still recognize the Republic of China as the legitimate representation of the country rather than the People's Republic. As a committee, you must decide your approach on dealing with the longstanding issue, and work on garnering respect for the "true" government.

The Vietnam War

In their attempt to spread communism around the world, the Chinese government has taken a strong stance with the communist North Vietnam, fighting against the capitalist South backed by the United States and France. In 1973, the war seemed close to finishing, as both sides were depleted and the casualties increased. However, on January 4th, 1974, President Thieu announced that the war in Vietnam had restarted. China is left to decide how it will move forward following the resumption of the war, specifically in light of the implementation of a new US President that has not yet established the same diplomatic relations as Nixon has.

Global Recognition and Relations

A newly appointed US President, tarnished relations with Russia, and a restarted war leave China in a difficult position regarding their global relations, especially considering that many countries in the world still do not recognize the standing Chinese government as the

legitimate one. The Chinese space program is lacking, their nuclear arms development is stunted, and the economy is not looking great, but Mao's great aspiration still lies in gaining international recognition as an economic, ideological superpower. This comes with making strategic decisions about allies and enemies and working to solve domestic problems as fast as possible to then be able to shift focus onto the bigger picture.

Questions to Consider

1. Who is next in line as leader of the PRC?
2. In the changing world, which powers can we trust and which will become our enemies?
3. How are we going to move forward domestically, following changing economic and industrial patterns within China?
4. How will the PRC maintain their newly appointed spot in the United Nations?
5. How will the PRC manage their ideological dissent for certain leaders with their economic dependence on other nations?

Character List

*Note that this does not guarantee the characters presence during the conference! Expect the unexpected always!

- Domestic Political (6)
 - Zhang Chengzhi - Author, Began “Red Guards” movement
 - Zhou Enlai - first Premier of the PRC
 - Kang Sheng - Chinese Communist Party official
 - Lu Jiaxi - Premier of Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ party
 - Zhang Chunqiao - Gang of Four member
 - Jiang Qing - Madame Mao; Actress
- International Political (5)
 - He Long- Member of Chinese Delegation to Moscow
 - Qian Xuesen - Director of the Fifth Academy of the PRC Ministry of Defense
 - Tu Youyou - Chemist, Researcher
 - Shěn Jiànhóng - PRC Ambassador for the USA
 - Huang Zhen - Chairman of the Liaison Office of the People’s Republic of China in the United States
- Military (5)
 - Chiang Kai-Shek - Generalissimo of the National Revolutionary Army
 - Ye Jianying - Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
 - Li Desheng - General in Chinese People’s Liberation Army
 - Peng Dehuai - Minister of National Defense

- Zhu De - 2nd Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
- Economic (3)
 - Deng Xiaoping - Chief of General Staff
 - Chen Boda - “Chief Interpreter of Maoism”
 - Chen Yun - Chairman of Central Advisory Commission
- Other (3)
 - Dong Biwu
 - Nie Yuanzi
 - Wang Hongwen

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NSC Cold War: China

Committee Background Guide

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