



COLD WAR USA

NYUMUNC XV

Joint Crisis Committee

Chair

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NSC Cold War: USA

Committee Background Guide



Joint Crisis Committee

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Welcome Letters

Meet Your Joint Crisis Director

Greetings Delegates!

My name is Sophie Chaves, and I am thrilled to be your joint crisis director for NYUMUNC's Cold War JCC! I grew up in Greenwich, Connecticut and am a third-year student at NYU majoring in Global Public Health and Biology and minoring in French.

I was briefly involved in MUN in high school and am now a current member of NYU's travel Team. I have staffed two of NYU's conferences and this is my first conference as joint crisis director! Outside of MUN, I research Public Health with NYU's Grossman School of Medicine and love to paint and read in my free time.

I'm very excited to staff this JCC and will work to ensure that this committee stays consistent and flows smoothly!

Good luck,

Sophie Chaves, Joint Crisis Director


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Meet Your Crisis Director

Greetings!

My name is Christopher Gilmartin, and I am thrilled to welcome you to the NSC Cold War committee. I am a freshman at the NYU College of Arts and Sciences, double majoring in psychology and physics, and a member of our NYUMUN travel team. I grew up in the Chicago Suburbs and attended Saint Ignatius College Prep, where I was a SIMUN delegate for four years.



Throughout those four years, I participated in over 20 travel conferences and was on the secretariat of the conference we hosted senior year. I absolutely love MUN not only because it enables diversity of thought and expression but also because of the interesting and unique ways to go about those notions through directives and crisis notes.

Furthermore, I am super excited to be your Crisis Director for The United States branch of this NSC. I have had the absolute privilege to participate in two Cold War committees, and I will do my best to ensure your experience is as entertaining, riveting, and enlightening as mine. Throughout your NYUMUNC experience, you will compete in 4 days of rigorous debate on this incredibly complicated war. Please come with your thinking cap ready to engage, participate, and debate. But most importantly, please come prepared to be creative and have fun, but not too much fun, because you never know what could happen!

Safe travels, delegates,

Christopher Gilmartin, Crisis Director of Cold War USA

cmg10120@nyu.edu

Meet Your Chair

Howdy,

My name is Charlie Schuyler, and I will be your Chair for this committee. I am a Senior, majoring in Film and Television Production, History, and Politics. In those majors I have had a particular interest in the way American domestic politics interacts with international politics. The Cold War is arguably the time in which this intersection was most pronounced and consequential. The time in which this committee is set, the day after Nixon resigns, is one of the most interesting hinge points



of the entire Cold War, and I am so excited to chair this committee and see y'all's unique take on one of the most unpredictable moments in modern history.

As for my own MUN experience, I have been doing it since high school, and joined NYU's travel team my Sophomore year, and have chaired previous NYUMUNCs and our high school conference, EmpireMUNC. When not being a nerd, my hobbies include playing Subway Surfer and drinking Red Bull. If you have any questions, feel free to reach out!

Yours,

Charlie Schuyler, Chair of Cold War USA

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Statement of Diversity and Inclusion

At NYUMUNC, we are dedicated to maintaining an educational and historically accurate experience for all participants. We acknowledge that discussions surrounding historical events, particularly in the context of the Cold War, involve many sensitive issues. Delegates are expected to approach these topics with a high level of maturity and respect. NYUMUNC is committed to promoting a culture of diversity and inclusion, aligning with NYU's values. We firmly reject the use of any bigoted symbols, statements, or attitudes during the entirety of our conference.

Recognizing the inherently sensitive nature of this committee's topic, NYUMUNC finds it imperative to establish explicit guidelines. Delegates are strictly prohibited from engaging in any actions involving crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression; this includes genocides, chemical warfare, war crimes, or any serious offenses. Delegates found in violation of these guidelines will face appropriate repercussions.

Should you have specific concerns or questions regarding the appropriateness of certain topics, we encourage you to reach out to us via email or during the conference. Thank you, and we look forward to a conference with a respectful, inclusive, and educational environment!

Introduction

Strap on your helmet and cue Bert the turtle, because in the wake of the Second World War, we find ourselves in a relentless pursuit of creating advanced weaponry. The aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki displayed the devastating power of the atomic bomb, propelling major powers, such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China, into a feverish race to develop hundreds to thousands of these weapons, all striving for technological advancement and superiority. On every front, these nations fervently competed to engineer explosives with increasing yield and even greater destructive abilities.

Enter the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I (SALT, 1969), a conference hosted by the United States with 27,552 warheads and the Soviet Union with 10,671 warheads. The purpose of these bilateral talks was to restrict the ever-growing stockpile of nuclear warheads amid escalating uncertainties during the Cold War. The treaty established several limitations on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). However, its failure stemmed from a lack of verification and the emergence of new technologies that allowed the development of more advanced weapons outside the treaty's original scope.

This committee starts with political turmoil: August 9th, 1974, with Nixon's resignation. As a delegate embodying the spirit of your character, you are tasked with navigating this tumultuous political and growing technological landscape. The echoes of failed treaties and the looming threat of unrestrained nuclear proliferation set the stage for a committee where every decision matters. As we step into the shoes of the National Security Council for the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China respectively, it is your duty to ensure that despite this race for nuclear proliferation and personal technological advancement, we must

come to an agreement to save the unpredictable future at hand from nuclear threat. The doomsday clock is approaching midnight so the stakes have never been higher. Welcome to the Cold War Joint Crisis Committee!

Committee Mechanics

The Cold War was a multifaceted period in which various positions, opinions, and events were held and occurred. Consequently, this branch will be part of a three-way Cold War Joint Crisis Committee (JCC), with the other two committees being China and the US. Each of the three committees will run as a typical crisis committee where the frontroom (caucuses and directives) and backroom (crisis notes and JPDs) will impact each committee's course of action. However, as this is a JCC, decisions, policies, and efforts within each committee will additionally impact the other two. These impacts can range from simple trade deals and policies to full-blown combat. You can also (and encouraged to) contact those on the other sides of the JCC through your back room by addressing the position you want to contact.

Each day will have new and exciting topics to discuss and crises to solve, some predetermined and some determined by your participation. To maximize your impact on the committee (and the NSC as a whole), try to respond to these topics with a combination of effectiveness and efficiency WHILE following the Statement of Diversity and Inclusion. We all want to have fun, but not at the expense of respect.

With regard to crisis notes, we will be utilizing a fast-paced, online two-pad system. You will be given two digital notepads (as well as physical one's for delegate usage), each corresponding to a different branch of your overall crisis arc. While you write on one digital notepad, the backroom will respond to the other. When the notes of all delegates have been

responded to, the backroom will come in, deliver a crisis update, and announce a timeline for the next note response cycle. This cycle will repeat up until the end of the committee on Saturday. Your JCD and CD would look favorably upon backroom requests that are realistic. Given that this is a historical committee and the seriousness of the topic, it should be approached with a commitment to realism and authenticity to the time period. Those who cleverly demonstrate this commitment will be recognized.

Ultimately, this committee will be incredibly complicated, but in a positive way. Because of this, we thank you for your patience, understanding, and best efforts for the weekend. If you have any further questions about committee logistics, please feel free to contact the JCD, CD, or Chair.

Background

At 2:45 AM local time on the morning of August 6, 1945, the Enola Gay, a B-29 Superfortress, and an observation plane called the “Necessary Evil” took off from the small island of Tinian. They were embarking on the first mission of the Cold War. At 7:09 AM, air raid sirens blared. At 8:14 Aioi Bridge is spotted by the Enola Gay, and the countdown begins. Exactly a minute later, bombardier Thomas Ferebe announces “bombs away.” The bomb falls for 43 seconds, then detonates. “Buildings melt and fuse together, human and animal tissue is vaporized. The blast wave travels at 984 miles per hour in all directions, demolishing over two-thirds of Hiroshima’s buildings in a massive, expanding firestorm. Eighty thousand people are instantly killed or grievously wounded. Over 100,000 more will die from the bomb’s effects in the coming months.”¹

¹National Park Service. “The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (U.S. National Park Service).” *Www.nps.gov*, 4 Apr. 2023, www.nps.gov/articles/000/the-atomic-bombings-of-hiroshima-and-nagasaki.htm.

Soviet leader Joseph Stalin accelerated his search for the bomb. “If a child doesn't cry,” Stalin told Igor Kurchatov, the scientific director of the Soviet project, “the mother doesn't know what he needs. Ask for whatever you like. You won't be refused.”² By 1949, Stalin had his bomb. This did not end the arms race, it accelerated it. In 1948 the United States had 55 nuclear weapons. By 1950 they had almost 700.³ The Soviets and the Americans raced to produce more weapons, with larger yields, longer ranges, that could be deployed more rapidly. Soon, the two great powers could destroy not only each other, but the world, many times over. Soviet domination of eastern Europe, in stark contrast to western Europe's closeness with America, had already created a bipolar world. With the 1949 test, that bipolarity became unchallengeable, and one of the great battles at the time was which side China would end up on.

The Chinese Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong, and the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, had been at war since 1927,⁴ although they had agreed to a cessation of combat to defeat the Japanese in 1937. When WWII ended in 1945, both the US and the USSR hoped that the Civil War would not be rekindled. The United States even sent George Marshall to negotiate peace talks, and the Soviets officially recognized the KMT well into the conflict. Despite entreaties by both the United States and the USSR, by 1947 the fighting had resumed in earnest. While the United States armed and aided the KMT, the Soviets provided little assistance to the CCP. In 1948, the Soviets made a peace proposal: “the KMT ruled the southern part of the Yangtze River while the Chinese Communists controlled the northern part, and that the United States should recognise the Soviet Union's special privileges in Manchuria.”⁵ The Soviets were

²McMillan, Priscilla Johnson. “NYTimes.” *Archive.nytimes.com*, 2 Oct. 1994, archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/06/specials/holloway-stalin.html.

³Rosenberg, David R. *U.S. Nuclear Stockpile, 1945 to 1950*. no. 5, May 1982, pp. 25–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1982.11455736>.

⁴Cucchisi, Jennifer. *The Causes and Effects of the Chinese Civil War, 1927-1949*. 2002, scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3416&context=dissertations.

⁵Kim, Donggil. “Stalin and the Chinese Civil War.” *Cold War History*, vol. 10, no. 2, May 2010, pp. 185–202, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14682741003619447>.

far more concerned with the balance of power than they were with the global revolution. Despite Soviet pressure to end the war, Mao and the CCP pressed on, defeating the KMT in October 1949, forcing Chiang Kai-shek and his men to flee to Taiwan. The United States refused to officially recognize Mao's China, the People's Republic of China, and instead chose to recognize the Republic of China Chiang Kai-shek's government in exile on Taiwan. Mao's victory, while not a setback for the USSR, was not as beneficial as it could have been. Stalin's refusal to back Mao is a wound that would continue to fester for years.

Meanwhile, Kim Il-Sung, the leader of North Korea, had been pressing Stalin for permission to invade the South. Stalin had been refusing, fearing the United States would become involved, but his calculus had changed. Stalin now had a bomb of his own. Additionally, American non-intervention in China gave him confidence they would refrain from intervening in Korea as well. Additionally, Mao's government had signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance earlier in 1950. When Kim asked again in April of 1950, Stalin acquiesced, but made it clear that Soviet forces would not become directly involved. Mao made no such equivocations. On June 25, the North invaded. The UN Security Council met to decide on a course of action, and unanimously condemned the North Korean invasion of South Korea that very day with Resolution 82. They then met again on the 27th, passing Resolution 83, which recommended military action against the North. The Soviet Union could have vetoed both of these, but they had been boycotting the Security Council since January due to the ROC's continued holding of China's permanent seat at the Security Council. In conjunction with this, President Harry Truman "ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa,"⁶ which

⁶ "Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea | Harry S. Truman." *W*www.trumanlibrary.gov, www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/public-papers/173/statement-president-situation-korea.

effectively put Taiwan, and by extension the ROC, under US protection. This “neutralization” of the Taiwan issue effectively ensured the existence of the “two Chinas.”⁷

Another key question raised by the Korean war was the efficacy of battlefield use for nuclear weapons. After all, the United States had a clearly superior stockpile, so what stopped them from using nuclear weapons? “Ultimately, it was not even clear that atomic bombing in a war against peasant armies would produce decisive results. If the Americans used the bomb and the Chinese forces kept on coming, it would demonstrate the bomb's ineffectiveness and reduce its deterrent effect in other arenas.”⁸ Nuclear weapons, even this early in the cold war, were proving themselves to be more effective as a political tool than as a battlefield weapon. (perhaps elaborate) Korean War ends in 1953.

The events of 1953 and 1954 marked a dramatic shift in the tenor of the Cold War. The death of Joseph Stalin provided an opportunity for a change in relations with the Soviet Union, as would the end of the Korean war. The United States also deployed a new tactic in these years, successfully overthrowing the democratically elected leaders of Iran and Guatemala, replacing them with more pliant clients.⁹ The Soviet Union’s leadership crisis after the death of Stalin is also resolved at this time, with Nikita Khrushchev becoming the new leader of the USSR. One of his first moves is to establish the Warsaw Pact, a defensive alliance against the West, essentially an answer to NATO. The People's Republic of China is invited, but they declined, instead attending the Bandung Conference (which was the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement) that same year. “Mao had sought Soviet support as a counterweight to potential American pressure on China in pursuit of American hegemony in Asia. But concurrently he tried to

⁷Matray, James. “Beijing and the Paper Tiger: The Impact of the Korean War on Sino-American Relations.” *International Journal of Korean Studies* , vol. XV, no. 1, p. 157, [icks.org/n/data/ijks/1483321954_add_file_8.pdf](https://www.icks.org/n/data/ijks/1483321954_add_file_8.pdf).

⁸ “The Korean War | American Experience | PBS.” *www.pbs.org*
www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/bomb-korean-war/#:~:text=Ultimately%2C%20it%20was%20not%20even.

⁹ “Cold War Timeline (Text Only)- History of War in the 20th Century.” *Publish.uwo.ca*,
publish.uwo.ca/~acopp2/historyofwar/coldwar/timeline-text.html.

organize the Non-Aligned into a safety net against Soviet hegemony.”¹⁰ The next year, Khrushchev would push Mao even further away.

At the 1956 party conference, Khrushchev delivered what came to be known as “the Secret Speech.” It was called this, in part, because the speech was closed to outsiders, including the Chinese delegation. The insult of not being allowed to witness the speech was little compared to the content. In the speech, officially called “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” Khrushchev sharply denounced the brutality of Stalin’s regime, describing many of its abuses in detail. Additionally, Khrushchev repudiated the very idea of “personality cults,” saying that the “classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the individual.”¹¹ The Chinese delegation worked to piece together what was said in conversation with those who were in the room, but they did not find out the full content of the speech, delivered on February 25th, until June 5th. And they had to find out from the New York Times, who had been leaked a copy by the CIA.¹² The headline that day blared “KHRUSHCHEV TALK ON STALIN BARES DETAILS OF RULE BASED ON TERROR.”¹³ This was not merely insulting to the Chinese leadership, it was potentially destabilizing. Whatever ideological and geopolitical differences Mao had with Stalin, his grip on power rested on a similar personality cult. In addition to denouncing Stalin, Khrushchev also announced a major reversal in Soviet relations with the West.

¹⁰Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. Penguin, 2011. pp.152

¹¹Khrushchev, Nikita. “Khrushchev’s Secret Speech, ‘on the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,’ Delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union | Wilson Center Digital Archive.” *Digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org*, 25 Feb. 1956.

digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/khrushchevs-secret-speech-cult-personality-and-its-consequences-delivered-twentieth-party.

¹²“Trade Secrets - Haaretz - Israel News.” *Web.archive.org*, 17 Feb. 2008, *web.archive.org/web/20080217092411/www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=69_298*.

¹³“KHRUSHCHEV TALK on STALIN BARES DETAILS of RULE BASED on TERROR; CHARGES PLOT for KREMLIN PURGES; U.S. ISSUES a TEXT Dead Dictator Painted as Savage, Half-Mad and Power-Crazed Khrushchev Discusses Delay Speech Adds Much Detail STALIN DEPICTED as SAVAGE DESPOT Korean War Data Awaited Many Officers Liquidated Revelations by Khrushchev ‘Leningrad Affair’ Recalled ‘Doctors’ Plot Laid to Stalin.” *The New York Times*, *timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1956/06/05/86605470.html?pageNumber=1*.

Instead of assuming the inevitability of war with the west, as there had been under stalin, the USSR would now pursue “peaceful coexistence.”¹⁴

Despite this push for “peaceful coexistence,” Khrushchev boasted frequently about the USSR's large stockpile of ICBMs, in hopes that the West's fear of nuclear annihilation would allow for him to extract political concessions. Khrushchev, however, was bluffing. The Soviet stockpile was relatively small, and, unbeknownst to Khrushchev, high level American officials knew this. In 1957, the Soviets launched Sputnik, the first spacecraft, which dramatically heightened fears of Soviet capabilities, even among high level officials who knew the stockpile was small. Just a month later, Khrushchev hosted a conference of socialist countries, the primary aim of which was to repair relations following the 1956 speech. Mao chose to attend, the second and last time he would leave China. While he paid lip service to Khrushchev's “peaceful coexistence,” the speech Mao delivered offered a stunning, and terrifying, alternate approach. “We shouldn't be afraid of atomic missiles,” Mao declared, “no matter what kind of war breaks out, conventional or nuclear, we will win... If the imperialists unleash war on us, we may lose more than 300 million people. So what? War is war. The years will pass and we will get to work making more babies than ever before.”¹⁵ It is in this context that Mao sparked another conflict with the United States.

On August 23, 1958, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) began shelling the Taiwanese islands of Quemoy and Matsu in what is known as the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. The shelling was, according to Mao, a response to the US and British occupations of Lebanon and Jordan that began that July.¹⁶ This operation was an implicit rebuke of Soviet inaction in response to

¹⁴“Milestones: 1953–1960 - Office of the Historian.” *State.gov*, 2019. history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/khrushchev-20th-congress.

¹⁵ Kissinger, Henry. *On China*. Penguin, 2011. pp. 154

¹⁶“Memoir by Wu Lengxi, ‘inside Story of the Decision Making during the Shelling of Jinmen’ | Wilson Center Digital Archive.” *Digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org*, digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/memoir-wu-lengxi-inside-story-decision-making-during-shelling-jinm.

American action in the Middle East. However, America did not know this, and assumed that the Chinese actions were done at the behest of Moscow. Thus, China strained Khrushchev's relationship with the West and enlisted him as a nuclear ally in a conflict over which he had no control. Mao's bid to undermine "peaceful coexistence" was largely unsuccessful. In fact, these actions did more to damage Sin-Soviet relations than Soviet-American. Moscow suspended nuclear cooperation, withdrew all technicians, and suspended all aid projects. The consequences of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, alongside the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, would leave China largely absent from the world stage in the decade to come.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev continued to pursue better relations with the United States. In 1959 then Vice-President Richard Nixon visited Khrushchev in Moscow, where they had their famous "kitchen table debate." The debate was seen by some as part of Nixon's campaign to win the presidency in 1960.¹⁷ His opponent in that race was the young Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy. Kennedy, as a part of his campaign, ran against the "missile gap," exasperating fears that the United States was weak, and the Eisenhower-Nixon administration was to blame. "The nation was losing the satellite-missile race with the Soviet Union because of" Kennedy claimed, "complacent miscalculations, penny-pinching, budget cutbacks, incredibly confused mismanagement, and wasteful rivalries and jealousies."¹⁸ Due in part to his stoking of these nuclear fears, Kennedy beat Nixon in 1960.

The Kennedy Administration, more than any other in American history, was defined by its relationship with nuclear armageddon. "On the one hand he created the Arms Control and

¹⁷ "News of the Week in Review", *The New York Times*, July 26, 1959

¹⁸ Preble, Christopher A. "Who Ever Believed in the "Missile Gap"?": John F. Kennedy and the Politics of National Security." *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 33, no. 4, 2003, pp. 801-26, www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27552538.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A6ce8a71f886e16ae307ceab4e5b2b165&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1.

Disarmament Agency, and on the other he expanded the number of American intercontinental ballistic missiles from some 60 to more than 420.”¹⁹ And then there was Cuba.

In 1959, Fidel Castro successfully overthrew the US backed Cuban Dictator Fulgencio Batista. The CIA, under orders from President Eisenhower and with the knowledge of Vice President Nixon, began drawing up plans to overthrow Castro. Nixon, to his own surprise, was not the man in the Oval Office once those plans were ready. In 1960, Kennedy ran to the right of Nixon on the issue of Cuba, castigating the administration's inaction. He was eager and ready to overthrow Castro, but when he was presented with the CIA's plan, he had second thoughts. The plan looked implausible, but, in the recollection of National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, “If we didn't do it [i.e., the operation], the Republicans would have said: ‘We were all set to beat Castro, and this chicken, this antsy-pantsy bunch of liberals’ ... there would have been a political risk in not going through with the operation. Saying no would have brought all the hawks out of the woodwork.”²⁰ The mission was launched in April of 1961, and Kennedy was right to be worried about the plan: it was a disaster.

In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro asked Moscow for assistance, and a delegation from the USSR arrived in May 1962 to discuss the requests. In September of 1961 Castro asked for surface to air (SAM) missiles, and as of May, 1962 they still hadn't arrived, and Moscow was indicating they would be sending even less than originally promised. The same was true of the Sopka shore missiles and of Soviet troops, which Castro hoped would serve as a sort of ‘trip wire’ to deter American invasion. So when the Soviet delegation offered Fidel Castro

¹⁹Paterson, Thomas G. *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963*. Oxford University Press, 1992. pp 5

²⁰Glejeses, Piero. “Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs.” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1, Feb. 1995, pp. 1–42.

nuclear weapons, the Cuban leader was surprised, to say the least.²¹ Cuba was the centerpiece of Khrushchev's grand scheme to rebalance the global order.

"I think," Khrushchev exclaimed, "we will win this operation!"

This operation would achieve three Soviet goals: "altering the international balance of power (the Soviets were behind in the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles) by scaring the United States with missiles nearby, protecting Fidel Castro's Cuba, and forcing a new settlement over the control of West Berlin."²² Khrushchev planned to dramatically announce the existence of the missiles at that year's meeting of the United Nations in November of 1962.

Khrushchev's plan began to unravel on October 16th. American U-2 spy planes had taken photos of Soviet medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba, and Kennedy's National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy delivered the news, along with his advice that the sites had to go. Kennedy concurred. What followed were 6 days of near constant deliberation between Kennedy and his top advisors. The initial plan was to bomb the sites. As it became clear this path may not be entirely effective, Kennedy sought other options. Eventually, Kennedy determined that a blockade, proposed by Secretary of Defense McNamara, was the best course of action. Despite all of the activity, the Kremlin remained unaware of the deliberations until the White House announced the President would be making a speech "of national importance."²³ They sensed, although did not know, that the Cuba plan had been discovered.

Khrushchev and his advisors were agitated, "the tragedy is that they can attack, and we shall respond," Khrushchev predicted, "this may end in a big war." Kennedy's speech, to the Kremlin's relief, did not announce an attack on Cuba. At least not yet. In the coming days, Soviet ships

²¹ Fursenko, Aleksander A., and Timothy J. Naftali. *Khrushchev's Cold War : The inside Story of an American Adversary*. W.W. Norton, 2007. Pp. 440

²²"Putin's Fear of Retreat." *Foreign Affairs*, 16 Nov. 2022, www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/putin-fear-retreat-cuban-missile-crisis.

²³ Fursenko, Aleksander A., and Timothy J. Naftali. *Khrushchev's Cold War : The inside Story of an American Adversary*. W.W. Norton, 2007. Pp. 467

approached the American blockade and the world crept ever closer to war. And then, it was over. As it was described to the American public, “we went eyeball to eyeball with the Russians—and they blinked.”²⁴ In fact, the Cuban missile crisis ended in an important deal, one which brought Khrushchev and Kennedy closer than any two of their predecessors. Khrushchev had offered to remove the missiles from Cuba, but only if the US removed similar missiles from Turkey. Known only to a few advisors, Kennedy did so, but only 6 months later, and only if the Soviets kept the deal a secret.²⁵ By October 27th, it was over.

In the following months, both Khrushchev and Kennedy attempted to build closer ties to each other, trying to lower the temperature and lessen the odds of global annihilation. By “midsummer 1963, the Soviet Union was on better terms with the United States than it was with the Peoples Republic of China.”²⁶

When Kennedy arrived in office, there was already war in Southeast Asia, although he was more concerned with Laos than Vietnam. Laos provided an early opportunity for Khrushchev and Kennedy to work together, negotiating Laotian neutrality at a Geneva conference in 1962.²⁷ In the meantime, things were escalating rapidly in Vietnam: there were under 1,000 US military advisors in Vietnam when Kennedy took office. By the end of 1962 there were 11,000,²⁸ and disaster was on the horizon.

Saturday, August 24th, 1963 was the zenith of what would become known as “the Buddhist crisis.” The South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem carried out a series of

²⁴ Kaplan, Fred. “What Robert Caro Got Wrong.” *Slate*, 31 May 2012, slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/05/robert-caros-new-history-of-lbj-offers-a-mistaken-account-of-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html.

²⁵ Kaplan, Fred. “What Robert Caro Got Wrong.” *Slate*, 31 May 2012, slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/05/robert-caros-new-history-of-lbj-offers-a-mistaken-account-of-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html.

²⁶ Fursenko, Aleksander A., and Timothy J. Naftali. *Khrushchev's Cold War : The inside Story of an American Adversary*. W.W. Norton, 2007. Pp. 28

²⁷ Editors, History.com. “Kennedy and Khrushchev Agree on Neutrality for Laos.” *HISTORY*, www.history.com/this-day-in-history/kennedy-and-khrushchev-agree-on-neutrality-for-laos.

²⁸ “JFK and Vietnam: The September 1963 TV Interviews | JFK Library.” *Www.jfklibrary.org*, www.jfklibrary.org/learn/education/teachers/curricular-resources/jfk-and-vietnam-the-september-1963-tv-interviews#:~:text=In%20May%201961%2C%20JFK%20authorized.

midnight raids killing hundreds, arresting thousands, and cutting the cables to the American embassy. President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara were all on vacation. To deal with the crisis, several high level deputies took it upon themselves to draft a cable to newly installed Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. These high level National Security Council deputies, either unwilling or unable to reach their direct superiors, called President Kennedy at his home in Hyannis Port directly. They asked the President for approval for what would become known as Cable 234: the cable that instructed Ambassador Lodge to tacitly endorse the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem, saying “we must face the possibility that Diem himself cannot be preserved.”²⁹

The cable was drafted by Michael Forrestal of the National Security Council along with Roger Hillsman and Averell Harriman of the State Department. The three men called Kennedy, who agreed to approve the cable if, and only if, the Secretary of State also approved. Then, the men called Rusk, who reportedly said “well, go ahead. If the President understood the implications, [I] would give a green light.”³⁰ Thus, they had the green light from both the Secretary of State and the president, if tenuously. After reaching out to other deputies, although no other cabinet level officials, they returned to Kennedy and informed him that the Cabinet officials had given him the green light. Having consulted none of his senior advisors, Kennedy greenlit a coup on the most important American ally in South East Asia.

On November 2, President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were executed in a military coup. President Kennedy would follow them a few weeks later. Krushchev would meet his own end, albeit less violently, a little over a year later. In 1964, the Soviet Union saw a leadership change with Leonid Brezhnev taking over as the General Secretary. Under Brezhnev,

²⁹ Douglas Martin. “Roger Hilsman, Adviser to Kennedy on Vietnam, Dies at 94.”

³⁰ Howard Jones. *Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War*, 315

the Soviet Union continued its policy of supporting communist movements worldwide, but also pursued détente with the United States, a policy aimed at easing the hostilities of the Cold War.

The Vietnam War escalated significantly during this period, becoming a central front of the Cold War. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam intensified under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, aiming to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. This conflict became highly controversial within the United States, leading to widespread protests and a deep national divide. Despite the massive U.S. military effort, the war ended with the withdrawal of American forces in 1973, and the subsequent fall of Saigon to the North Vietnamese forces in 1975, marking a significant setback for U.S. foreign policy and a victory for the Soviet Union and its allies.

The arms race continued unabated during this period, with both superpowers developing and stockpiling an increasing number of nuclear weapons. The threat of nuclear annihilation remained a constant concern globally. However, recognizing the dire implications of this arms buildup, the U.S. and the Soviet Union began to engage in negotiations to limit the growth of their nuclear arsenals. This led to the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) treaty in 1972, which aimed to restrict the number of ballistic missile launchers both countries could have. This was a significant step towards reducing the risk of nuclear conflict.

In 1968, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies invaded Czechoslovakia to crush the Prague Spring, a series of reforms and liberalizations that threatened to loosen the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe. This intervention demonstrated the limits of Soviet tolerance for reform within its sphere of influence and reaffirmed the rigidity of the Iron Curtain.

The period also saw attempts at improving relations between East and West Germany, culminating in the signing of the Basic Treaty in 1972, which normalized the relationship

between the two German states. This was part of Ostpolitik, West Germany's policy aimed at improving relations with the East, including the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The U.S.-China relations underwent a significant transformation when President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, leading to the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries. This strategic rapprochement aimed at isolating the Soviet Union, leveraging the Sino-Soviet split to the advantage of the United States. The opening to China marked a pivotal shift in the Cold War dynamics, introducing a new geopolitical triangle that complicated the bipolar rivalry that had defined the previous decades.

Throughout this period, the Cold War continued to influence global affairs, from Africa to Latin America, where U.S. and Soviet support for opposing factions fueled conflicts and political upheavals. The Cuban Missile Crisis had left a lasting impression on both superpowers, highlighting the catastrophic potential of their rivalry. Consequently, despite ongoing tensions and conflicts, there was a growing recognition of the need for dialogue and negotiation to prevent a nuclear confrontation.

JCC Breakdown

Cuban Missile Crisis

The 13-day-long Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the most frightening periods throughout the entirety of the Cold War. In 1962, Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet premier, pledged to defend communist Cuba and began construction on missile bases less than 100 miles away from U.S. shores. What he did not expect, however, was when, in 1962, the United States demanded the halt of these bases.

Throughout the next fortnight, tensions between the United States and the USSR rose with the impending threat of nuclear warfare. On October 22nd, President John F. Kennedy delivered a dramatic 18-minute television speech about “unmistakable evidence” revealing a nuclear threat.

Kennedy made it clear: the missiles must go. A naval blockade, the first of its kind, was swiftly implemented by the U.S. to prevent further Soviet shipments to Cuba. The world held its breath as ships from both nations stood poised at the edge of confrontation, ready to enforce their leaders’ will.

October 24th saw tense confrontations at sea as Soviet ships approached the blockade line. The USS Randolph and the Soviet tanker Bucharest engaged in a high-stakes game of brinkmanship, each testing the other’s resolve. Yet, miraculously, disaster was averted as the Soviet ships turned back.

As diplomatic channels crackled with urgency, the world learned of the secret communications between Kennedy and Khrushchev. Behind closed doors, the leaders grappled with the unthinkable: the potential annihilation of millions (ironic).

In Moscow, Khrushchev sent a letter on October 26th, proposing a deal: the USSR would remove missiles from Cuba if the U.S. pledged not to invade the island and secretly agreed to remove its missiles from Turkey.

Aware of the delicate balance, Kennedy accepted the offer, publicly announcing the end of the crisis on October 28th. The world let out a collective sigh of relief as the immediate threat of nuclear war subsided. The crisis, however, left an indelible mark. It prompted the installation of a direct hotline between the White House and the Kremlin to prevent such misunderstandings

in the future. The superpowers had danced on the edge of the abyss, and the world had watched, holding its breath, as they stepped back.

Yet, the Cuban Missile Crisis remains a reminder of how close humanity came to the precipice of self-destruction in the chilling grip of the Cold War.

Vietnam War

The Vietnam War, a divisive and tumultuous chapter in American history, began quietly with military advisors aiding South Vietnam against the Viet Cong. By the early 1960s, the conflict escalated as North Vietnamese forces grew bolder.

President Lyndon B. Johnson, facing the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, gained broad war powers with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. American troops landed in Vietnam in increasing numbers by 1965, launching Operation Rolling Thunder to cripple North Vietnam.

However, the war revealed complexities: Viet Cong guerrilla tactics and the challenging jungle terrain tested American forces. General William Westmoreland's strategy focused on attrition, as seen in battles like La Drang, Khe Sanh, and the Tet Offensive.

Back home, dissent swelled with anti-war protests questioning the war's morality and purpose. President Richard Nixon pursued Vietnamization, gradually withdrawing troops while aiding South Vietnam's defense.

The Paris Peace Accords of 1973 offered hope, leading to the U.S. troop withdrawal. Yet, the fall of Saigon in 1975 marked a bitter end, with images of helicopters evacuating the embassy symbolizing the war's closing chapter.

The Vietnam War left indelible scars on America, reshaping its politics, military, and global engagement. Its legacy, reflecting the sacrifices of veterans and its impact on society, continues to resonate deeply.

Space Race and Moon Landing

The Space Race between the United States and the Soviet Union captivated the world, marking a period of intense rivalry and groundbreaking achievements in space exploration.

It all began with the Soviet Launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, the first artificial satellite to orbit the Earth. This event shocked the U.S. and spurred them into action.

In response, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established NASA in 1958, kicking off a series of ambitious space missions. The Mercury and Gemini programs paved the way for the Apollo missions.

On July 20, 1969, the world held its breath as Apollo 11, with astronauts Neil Armstrong, Buzz Aldrin, and Michael Collins, landing on the moon. Armstrong's famous words, "That's one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind," echoed across the globe.

The Moon Landing was a scientific feat and a triumph of human ingenuity and determination. It signaled American dominance in the Space Race and remains one of humanity's greatest achievements.

Arms Race

The Cold War Arms Race between the United States and the Soviet Union was a tense and dangerous competition characterized by the rapid development of nuclear weapons and missile technology.

It began after World War II, as both superpowers sought to build their arsenals to deter the other. The Soviet Union shocked the world again in 1949 with its successful test of an atomic bomb, breaking America's monopoly.

Both sides engaged in a game of one-upmanship, with missile testing, nuclear tests, and the creation of elaborate defense systems. Efforts like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) attempted to curb the race, leading to agreements like the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The Arms Race came to a symbolic end with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, marking the conclusion of a decades-long struggle for military supremacy. Yet, its legacy of nuclear proliferation and the specter of mutually assured destruction remain powerful reminders of the tumultuous era.

Essential Topics to Understand

October 26-November 9, 1969: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union in Helsinki, Finland. The talks aimed to reduce the number of strategic nuclear weapons held by both superpowers. President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. This marked the beginning of efforts to curb the nuclear arms race and establish a mutual understanding of nuclear weapons.

December 1979: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 marked a significant escalation of the Cold War. The invasion aimed to prop up a communist government in Afghanistan, facing a growing insurgency. The United States, along with other Western nations, condemned the invasion and provided support to Afghan resistance fighters, including the

mujahideen. This conflict would continue throughout the 1980s and be seen as a costly and ultimately unsuccessful endeavor for the Soviet Union.

March 1983: Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)

President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), known as "Star Wars," a proposed missile defense system to protect the United States from attack by ballistic strategic nuclear weapons. The initiative proposed deploying ground and space-based systems to intercept and destroy incoming missiles. The announcement of SDI raised tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, with concerns about its impact on the balance of power and the viability of existing arms control agreements.

November 1989: Fall of the Berlin Wall

The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, symbolized the end of the Cold War division between East and West Germany. The wall, which had separated East and West Berlin since 1961, was a physical manifestation of the ideological and political divide between the Soviet bloc and the Western democracies. Its fall marked a turning point in history, leading to the reunification of Germany and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

December 1991: Dissolution of the Soviet Union

On December 25, 1991, the Soviet flag was lowered from the Kremlin for the last time, marking the end of the Soviet Union. The dissolution of the USSR was the culmination of years of economic stagnation, political unrest, and the failure of communist ideology. The end of the Cold War was officially declared, and the world entered a new era with the United States as the sole superpower.

Current Issues

Nixon Resignation

Richard Nixon, facing near-certain impeachment over the Watergate scandal, becomes the first U.S. president to resign from office. His resignation, effective immediately, follows intense scrutiny over the break-in at the Democratic National Committee headquarters and subsequent cover-up attempts. Vice President Gerald Ford was sworn in as the 38th President of the United States, promising to restore trust in government and lead the nation through a tumultuous time.

Vice President Selection

President Gerald Ford selected former New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller as his Vice President following the resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew due to corruption charges. Ford cited Rockefeller's experience and leadership as crucial during the political transition. The nomination faces Senate confirmation, with Rockefeller's strong background in government and finance seen as an asset for the administration. However, this has yet to happen, and it is of uppermost importance that the committee selects the best course of action for the United States of America.

January 21, 2023: Global Concerns Rise Over Nuclear Proliferation

Recent developments in nuclear proliferation have sparked international concern, with multiple countries expanding their nuclear capabilities. The United States, along with other nuclear powers, faces growing pressure to address disarmament and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Efforts to strengthen existing non-proliferation agreements and promote

diplomatic solutions to regional conflicts are underway as the world navigates the complex challenges of nuclear security in the 21st century.

Questions to Consider

1. How should the US adjust its foreign policy towards Nixon's resignation?
2. Where can the US increase its influence worldwide? How could doing so favor the interests of both the nation and your character?
3. How should the US address the Vietnam War withdrawal?
4. How can the USA successfully compete with the USSR, the PRC, and other nations?
5. Given the increasingly powerful nuclear weapons, what qualifications justify the use?
6. How does your character feel about the US military buildup? Is it insufficient, unnecessary, or somewhere in the middle?

Character List

*Note that this does not guarantee the characters presence during the conference! Expect the unexpected always!

- Domestic Political:
 - **William B. Saxbe** - Attorney General
 - **Rogers Morton** - Secretary of the Interior
 - **Earl Butz** - Secretary of Agriculture
 - **Casper Weinberger** - Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
 - **James T. Lynn** - Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
 - **Claude Brinegar** - Secretary of Transportation
 - **Alexander Haig** - Chief of Staff
 - **Robert T. Hartmann** - Counselor to the President
 - **Philip W. Buchen** - White House Counsel
 - **Alexander Haig** - Chief of Staff
- International Political:
 - **William D. Eberle**- United States Trade Representative
 - **John A. Scali** - Ambassador to the United Nations
 - **Brent Scowcraft** - Deputy National Security Advisor
 - **Walter J. Stoessel Jr.** - Ambassador to the USSR
 - **David K. E. Bruce.** - Ambassador to the CCP
- Military:
 - **James R. Schlesinger** - Secretary of Defense
 - **George Scratchley Brown** - Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - **Andrew Goodpaster** - NATO Supreme Allied Commander

- Economic:
 - **William E. Simon**- Secretary of the Treasury
 - **Frederick B. Dent** -Secretary of Commerce
 - **Peter J. Brennan**- Secretary of Labor
 - **Roy Ash** -Director of the Office of Management and Budget

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